1 Art. 296 of the Law of the Sea Convention states that any decision rendered by any court or tribunal having jurisdiction under the Convention shall be ſ nal and attracts the obligation of compliance. It omits the customary phrase 'and without appeal'. Annex VI, Art. 33 (1) is similar. The reason apparently is that some 'ſ nal' decisions envisaged in the Convention may be subject to some sort of recourse, including 'appeal' in other courts or tribunals, including domestic courts or tribunals. At the same time, the absence of those words would not prevent some other treaty conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal from containing provisions regarding possible appeal. The Virginia Commentary cites, in this respect, Iran v U. S.A. Case No. 21 (1987) and diplomatic requirements have led to the development of further forms of reference to the International Court. These, which are based on the International Court's normal jurisdiction, include disputes over the existence, the validity, the nullity, the procedural regularity of an arbitral award, and a form of appeal from the judgment of some other international court or tribunal in a case in which only one party was a State. There is also limited experience of a form of cassation employing the International Court's advisory competence for review of deſ ned legal aspects of another tribunal's decision.
Where the proceedings involve the Court's contentious jurisdiction under speciſ c provisions of its Statute, the seisin of the Court is effected by the simple ſ ling of the instrument instituting the proceedings in accordance with particular provisions of the Statute and the Rules of Court governing that form of case. In other cases the normal rules of jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae apply and the respondent's consent to the particular litigation is required. Although there is to date no experience of this in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, given the close reƀ ection of the ICJ's Statute in that of ITLOS, one may assume that the same principles will apply there should occasion arise.
Given the speciality of the jurisdiction over interpretation and revision cases in the International Court of Justice, special rules govern the institution of those proceedings, and to some extent we ſ nd them imitated in arbitration proceedings. Those Rules govern the form and contents of the instrument effecting the seisin of the Court for cases of the interpretation and for the revision of judgments of those Courts and Tribunals. There are also rules for all forms of reference to the International Court and to the Law of the Sea Tribunal from other international organs that may have dealt with a case. The reference must be based on some treaty in force or otherwise the respondent has to give speciſ c consent to the reference.
An important feature of all these cases is that each is technically a new case. Opening the meeting of the Court on 17 February 1999 (CR 99/3), at which the judges ad hoc made their solemn declarations in the revision phase of the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, the President (Judge Schwebel) said that a request for interpreAnnex VII (on arbitration), Art. 11, uses the customary formula 'ſ nal and without appeal'. See the Virginia Commentary at p. 434. With regard to the Seabed Disputes Chamber, Annex VI, Article 39 provides that its decisions 'shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought'. There is no known instance of this at the time of writing.
